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Abstract
In this paper, we give a solution to the Free Choice Paradox.
This is done in two stages. First, we have a close look at the log-
ical interpretation of the natural language statements that lead
to the paradox. This leads to making the important distinction of
permitting an action in isolation or permitting it in combination
with some or any other action, i.e. in a certain context. This
distinction is made formal by the introduction of a new operator
on actions, which forces them to be performed in isolation.
With this distinction made clear it is possible to give a "new",
stronger definition for the permission operator, which solves the
Free Choice Paradox and which does not lead to any new incon-
sistencies or paradoxes.
To appear in: Proceedings, Workshop on Deontic Logic in
Computer Science (DEON’94), 6–8 January 1994.
1 Introduction
The paradox of free choice permission is described at several places
[Hil, Kam74] and has defied several attempts to be solved. It can be
exemplified as follows:
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(1) P(talk to the president)   P(talk to the president
 shoot the president)
If it is permitted to talk to the president then it is also permitted to
talk to the president or shoot him. The problem lies in the fact that
the combined action of "talking or shooting the president" is permitted,
although the choice of how this action should be performed is not free.
Basically, there are two approaches to resolving the paradox.
The first is by limiting the choice. That is, the disjunction of the actions
does not mean a free choice between the actions. The choice can be
limited by some context. A good example of this type of solution can be
found in [MW92, Mey92] . However, although this approach does solve
the paradox, it also introduces some new problems. More important is
that it will still allow for the following implication to be true:
(2) P(shoot a gun & aim in the air)   P(shoot a gun)
Although this statement is not mentioned as an example of the free
choice paradox it is basically of the same form. It can even be written
in the format of the original paradox as follows:
(3) P(shoot a gun & aim in the air)  
P((shoot a gun & aim in the air) 
(shoot a gun & not aim in the air))
It may be clear that any solution to the free choice paradox should also
block the above implication. Therefore, any method that works only
on the basis of the choice operator () will not be sufficient to solve
the paradox completely because (2) does not contain a choice operator
but can still be seen as an instance of the free choice paradox as shown
through (3).
The second approach to resolving the paradox (and the one
that we will take in this paper) is by invalidating the implication. If
the implication is no longer valid then the paradox does not occur.
Invalidating the implication can only be done by giving a different
semantics for the permission. Of course, this might also lead to some
other difficulties. However, we will see that these problems can be
solved through a proper representation of deontic sentences in logic.
Before we give a new definition for permission we will, in
the next section, first discuss the exact meaning of the combination of
deontic operators with actions. This will lead to some new definitions
for actions which will be introduced in section 3. In section 4, we will
discuss the definition for the permission operator and show how the Free
Choice Paradox can be resolved while avoiding some other problems.
In section 5, we discuss a possible refinement to the theory based on the
previous sections. Finally, in section 6, we draw some conclusions and
point out some future research.
2 Analysis of natural language
Before we start to analyze the Free Choice Paradox it is important to
describe the exact meaning of the combination of the deontic operators
with actions, as they occur in natural language. We will look at the
simple action "open the window" and define its meaning when it is
combined with each of the deontic operators. It will appear that the
main point of interest is whether the action is supposed to be performed
in isolation, in combination with any other action or in combination with
a restricted set of other actions. The underlying maxim for the meaning
of all the combinations of actions with deontic operators is that a state
of violation (of some constraint) should be avoided. E.g. if an action is
permitted then it is certain that the performance of that action will not
lead to a violation state if performed in isolation.
Obligation
The sentence "It is obliged to open the window" means that, at least the
window has to be opened. This action should be performed. It might be
in parallel with any other action, but that does not matter. In this sense
the action in this sentence can therefore be taken to be "open". For more
details see [Dig92] .
Prohibition
The sentence "It is forbidden to open the window" also uses the action
in an open sense. The window should not be opened, no matter which
other action is performed in parallel. I.e. if the window is not opened
but the heater is turned of, we will still not arive in a violation state.
Notice that in reality a prohibition is usually not that strict. Usually it is
possible to find some exceptions to the prohibition. E.g. "It is forbidden
to open the window, except when the window is replaced". For the
moment we will not consider these exceptions and assume that they are
specified specifically as done above.
One will, however, not use the sentence "It is forbidden to open the
window", if there are normal actions such that if they are performed
together with the opening of the window will lift the prohibition.
E.g. if it is allowed to open the window when at the same time the door
is closed, then one would not normally say that it is forbidden to open
the window.
Permission
The sentence "It is permitted to open the window" does NOT use the
action in an open sense. The permission to open the window does not
seem to imply that this can be done together with any other action. E.g.
the above permission does not mean that it is permitted to open the
window and turn on the heater. The permission is ONLY for opening
the window.
Without having done any linguistic research it seems natural
that the meaning of the action together with the obligation and pro-
hibition is different from the meaning of that action together with a
permission. This is due to the character of the obligation and prohibi-
tion. These two operators can be seen as limiting the wanted actions.
This should always be done in as wide a sense as possible, so that it is
never possible to approve an unwanted action.
The permission can be seen as making actions wanted. For the same
reason as given for the other two operators the permission should be
given in the most strict sense, so that it is never possible to perform an
unwanted action (that is permitted).
The above observations lead to the conclusion that the (logical)
interpretation of the actions is different when combined with different
deontic operators. In the next section we will show how these differences
can be accommodated in the deontic logic as described in [Mey88,
WMW89, DM90, Dig92] .
3 Interpretation for actions in logic
3.1 Introduction
In [Mey88, DM90, Dig92] the standard interpretation of an action was
given in an open sense, i.e. if an action is specified it means that that
actions is performed, p[ossibly in combination with other actions. The
reason for this is twofold. First it is more natural. Usually there is no
complete knowledge of the world. In that case it is easier to be able to
specify the action of which one is certain that it occurs, without having
to say anything about the other actions.
The second reason is that it facilitates the definition of the negation of
an action, which is needed in this approach to model the obligation. See
[DM90] for more explanations on this topic.
We will keep this "standard" interpretation of an action, but we
will add an operator to indicate that an action is performed in isolation.
This operator is (quite obviously) called the "only" operator.
The intuitive meaning of only  is that  is performed and all other
actions are not performed.
In the next section we give the formal semantic definition of
the only operator. This definition is based on the semantics of the actions
as given in the appendix. This semantics is a simplified version of the
one used in [Mey88]. The simplification consists in the restriction to
actions, and not considering sequences of actions. This extension can
be easily made, but would obscure the points that we try to make in this
paper. At this point we will only introduce a few definitions from the
appendix that are necessary for the following sections. The definitions
that relate the actions to states can be found in the appendix.
We start with a set of eventsA, with typical elements a b c.
There is one special event , which is not an element of A, and which
stands for failure.(comparable to deadlock in process algebra). The set
of events A will form the basis for the semantics of the actions in our
language Act.
The atomic actions in these languages are denoted by underlined ver-
sions of events fromA. Thus if a  A then a is an atomic action in Act.
The set of all action expressions can now be determined by the following
BNF for its elements ():
 ::   aj12j1&2jjanyjfail
The meaning of 12 is a choice between 1 and 2. 1&2 stands
for the parallel execution of 1 and 2. The expression  stands for the
non-performance of the action . The any action is a universal or ”don’t
care which” action. Finally the fail action is the action that always fails
(deadlock). This action does not lead to a next state.
In the following section we make use of the following concepts of
actions:
Definition 1
1. atomic actions a and their negations a are called action literals.
2. an action term is a conjunction (using the & operator) of one
or more action literals.
The semantics of actions are given by sets of what we call synchronicity
sets (or s-sets for short). A synchronicity set denotes a set of events that
are executed simultaneously. They are the basic building blocks of the
semantics.
Definition 2
1. The set fg is a synchronicity set.
2. Every non-empty subset of A is an s-set.
Notation: In concrete cases we write the sets with square brackets, in
order to distinguish them easily from other sets that we will use. So, the
s-set consisting of  is written as [] and the s-set consisting of the events
a and b is written as
 
a
b

. The powerset of s-sets will be denoted by

 
 A, where the ’+’ indicates that the s-sets are non-empty.
Definition 3 The domain D for our model for actions from Act is the
collection of sets consisting of s-sets.
The semantics of actions in Act are defined as follows:
Definition 4 The semantic function   Act  D is given by:
a  fS  
 
 Aja  Sg
12  1 2
1&2  1 2
  

fail  fg
any    A
In the above definition ,  and are operators on the semantic domain
D, and roughly correspond to disjunction, conjunction and complement.
The precise definition of these operators can be found in the appendix.
Finally we define the equality of actions and some kind of
implication between actions in terms of their semantics.
Definition 5 We define 1 D 2 iff [[1]]= [[2]].
We define 1  2 iff [[1]] [[2]].
If 1 D 2 then we say that 1 and 2 are intensionally equivalent.
If 1  2 then we say that 1 involves 2.
3.2 Only
We will first introduce the only operator in the syntax:
Definition 6 Let   Act and  does not contain the only operator,
then only   Act .
We explicitly exclude the possibility to nest the only operator, because
it makes no sense to apply the operator twice.
In the semantics for only  we require that  is of a very
strict format, which we will call strict disjunctive normal form. The
definition of this format is given in two steps:
Definition 7 An action is in disjunctive normal form if it is a finite
disjunction (using the  operator) of one or more action terms not con-
taining .
Definition 8 The action  is in strict disjunctive normal form if it is in
disjunctive normal form and for every subexpression of  of the form
12 holds that
 neither 1  2 nor 2  1.
 neither 1  fg nor 2  fg.
The semantics of the only operator is only defined on actions that are in
strict disjunctive normal format. The reason is the interaction between
the choice operator and the only operator. Intuitively it is clear that it
makes more sense to say "John only opens the window" then something
like:"John only opens the window or closes the door". That is, the only
operator works more natural on atomic actions (and their conjunctions)
then on disjunctions of actions. This is due to the fact that the only
operator restricts the actions that are taking place, while the choice
operator does the reverse. This difficulty is reflected in the definition of
the only operator.
Fortunately, in the following we can use the property:
Theorem 1 For any action  there exists an action   such that   is
in strict disjunctive normal form and    .
Proof: Follows direct from the semantics and the definitions.  
E.g. [[a a&b]]= [[a]].
The righthand-side stands for "any action that includes a". Clearly, this
includes the actions that contain a and b. Therefore it is clear that the
equivalence above holds.
It should be noted that there is no unique   for each .
Now, we define the semantics of the only operator in two
steps:
Definition 9
1. Let a be an atomic action then
only a  fag
1.2 only a  a
2. Let  and  be action terms then
1. only &  fSjS  S1  S2 and S1   and S2 
g
3. Let  be an action in strict disjunctive normal form.
1.  is an action literal or an action term then only  is
defined as above.
2.   12 then only   only 1 only 2
only  1&2 
Note: In the definition above it is stated that only a  a which
means that the only operator has no effect on negated actions. This
is due to the fact that these negated actions are already minimal in the
following sense: It is not possible to leave out any synchronicity set from
the semantics and still keep a meaningful definition of the negation.
Notation: In the rest of this paper, whenever we write only , we
assume that  is in strict disjunctive normal form.
It is easy to see from the definition that the only operator does
not distribute over the other operators. That is:
only & 	
D
only &only 
only  	
D
only only 
only  	
D
only 
This can be seen with the following very small example where we take
the set of all events A to be fa bg.
only a&b  f
 
a
b

g 	
fg  fag

fbg  only a&only b
only ab  fa b
 
a
b

g 	
fa bg  fag

fbg  only a  only b
only a  a  fbg 	
fb
 
a
b

g  fag

 only a

 only a
Because the only operator does not ditribute over any of the other
operators there are not many properties that can be proven for this
operator. The only properties that are important to mention here are the
following:
Proposition 1
only 
 
  
Proof: Easy by induction. 
This property means that only   leads to less possible states than .
Proposition 2 Let  	
D
 and let  and  both be action terms not
containing negation then
only &only  
D
fail
Proof: Easy by induction. 
This proposition states that only  and only , in general, cannot be
performed in combination.
With the only operator defined, in the next section, we will
discuss the permission operator and the Free Choice Paradox.
4 Permission
We will now take a closer look at the definition of the deontic opera-
tors (especially the permission) and discuss their relation with the Free
Choice Paradox. The definition of the deontic operators, as it is standard
for this kind of approach (cf. [Mey88, WMW89, MW92, Mey92]), is
as follows:
O V iolation
F  V iolation
P  
F  

V iolation
We will only discuss the definition of the permission operator at this
place. A discussion of the other operators (especially the obligation)
can be found at several places in the literature [Mey88, MW92, Mey92,
WMW89, Dig92].
The definition above states that  is permitted if there is a way to do
 such that it does not lead to a violation state (a state in which the
special predicate V iolation is true). Remember that the meaning of 
is that  is performed, possibly in parallel with other actions. So the
specification of  contains an implicit choice about the context in which
 is performed. Of course, this definition is quite weak. An action is
permitted if there is a way to do it in a desirable way. This means that
an action  might be permitted, although there is only one way that does
not lead to a violation state (e.g. when  is done only together with ),
while all other ways lead to a violation. If we assume that each action is
initiated by some actor, it also means that P   says that the actor (the
person that initiates the action) is permitted to choose how to perform
. It depends on the choice of the actor whether or not a violation state
will arise. It is not surprising that this notion of permission gives rise to
the Free Choice Paradox.
At this point it should also be noted that the introduction of the only
operator does NOT by itself resolve the paradox. It can easily be seen
that P  only a P  only ab.
In order to avoid this paradox, we use another definition for
permission, which is motivated by the analysis of section 2.
Definition 10
P    
V iolation
Which means that  is permitted if  does never lead to a violation state.
This definition solves the Free Choice Paradox, because of the
following observation:
	 	  	
and therefore also

V iolation 	  
V iolation
Thus:
P   	  P  
In the same way the definition also solves the parodox of context-
sensitive permission:
&	 	  	
and thus
P  & 	  P  
Although this definition of the permission operator solves the
Free Choice Paradox it also raises three new issues. We will now discuss
each of these.
4.1 Permission to fail
The new, strong definition for the permission implies that fail is also
permitted, which can be seen from the following:
for all 	 : fail	
fail
V iolation
P  fail
So, it follows directly from the definition that fail is permitted. Al-
though, at first sight, this might look a bit strange it does not pose any
problems for the theory. The only consequence is that, at any moment,
it is permitted to terminate all activities (get into a deadlock). However,
this does not mean that it should be done and in fact it is also forbidden
to do so (This can be easily checked from the definition).
4.2 Permission for conjunction
The second issue raised by the strong definition of the permission is the
following proposition:
Proposition 3
P     P  &
Proof: Follows directly from the fact that 	   &	.  
So, if  is permitted, it is (also) permitted in any combination with other
actions. This leads to the following example:
P (fire a gun)   P (fire a gun & aim at the president)
Given our interpretation of P   as "no matter how you perform  a
permitted state of the world results", this is natural.
The implication follows from the following line of reasoning:
fire a gun & aim at the president  fire a gun 
	 fire a gun	   fire a gun & aim at the president	
fire a gun
V iolation  
fire a gun & aim at the president
V iolation
P  fire a gun   P  fire a gun & aim at the president
Given our strong interpretation of the permission, using the
prudencial assumption of Grice about the maxims of communication,
what we actually mean by:
It is permitted to buy a gun
is more appropriately represented as:
P  only buy a gun
This permission does still imply permissions like
P  only buy a gun & shoot the president
P  only buy a gun & shoot the president or
P  only buy a gun & only shoot the president
But the big difference is that all these actions are equal to fail. That
this is indeed true can be easily seen from the semantics of the different
actions.
So, in general, we do have:
P     P  &
but by choosing the appropriate logical interpretation for the actions, we
force & to be fail. Therefore effectively blocking the performance
of the combination of actions.
More specific we have:
P  only    P  only &only 
but only &only  
D
fail if  and  are action terms that contain
no negation.
Therefore, we can conclude that the problem, that is seemingly created
by the strong definition of the permission, can be resolved by using an
appropriate interpretation of the natural language sentences (using the
only operator).
4.3 Complementarity of permission and prohibition
The third issue that is raised by the definition is that the permission is
no longer complementary to the prohibition. I.e. P   	 
F  . With
the new definition for the permission there can be actions  such that

P    
F  .
In fact, this point is an advantage of this strong definition of the permis-
sion. Usually, it is not the case that every action is either permitted or
forbidden. Many actions are neither permitted nor forbidden, although
they might be permitted or forbidden in some combination with other
actions.
Of course, we do still have the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Let  	
D
fail then:
P     
F  
or equivalently
F     
P  
Proof: By definition. 
I.e. if something is permitted than it is not forbidden, and if something
is forbidden than it is not permitted.
The fact that permission and prohibition are no longer com-
plementary in our system also influences the following implication that
holds in all the deontic systems that are defined in terms of dynamic
logic like is done in [Mey88].
O   
P     F  any
Which means that if an action is obliged and at the same time not
permitted then it is forbidden to do anything.
In our system we do have that
O   F     F  any
But we leave open the possibility that  is not permitted in general
(i.e. 
P  ), but is permitted in specific combinations. For instance, it
might be permitted to do &&
. By performing this combination we
fulfil the obligation while not doing anything forbidden.
Note that we do NOT have:
O    
F    
O 
So, there is no guarantee that if  is obliged it is not forbidden. It is still
possible to have contradictory obligations.
4.4 Preliminary conclusions
Taking the above points into account, we can state that the Free Choice
Paradox is solved by using this strong definition of the permission. The
appropriate use of the only operator in the translation from natural lan-
guage to logic avoids the problems that were raised with this definition.
Although the combination of the only operator for actions and the strong
definition for the permission resolves the problems with the Free Choice
paradox, it also raises some new issues.
The first point to be mentioned is that the only operator can
only be applied to actions in strict disjunctive normal form, which is a
big restriction on its use. Also the operator does not distribute over any
of the other connectors of actions, which also limits its use. However,
in practice, the only operator is mainly applied to atomic actions and
their conjunctions. Therefore, these restrictions on the use of the only
operator do not have very severe consequences.
The second point is, in practice, maybe more serious. Using
the traditional definitions, P   means that  is permitted, possibly in
combination with other actions. It is not necessary to explicitly state all
the combinations that are allowed. Using P  only  is much stricter
in the sense that it only allows  to be performed by itself. If it can
be performed in combination with other actions, then this has to be
explicitly stated, unless it can be performed in combination with any
other action, in which case we can use P  .
The latter, however, almost never (if ever) occurs. It is almost always
possible to find an action which should not be performed in combination
with the permitted one (e.g. take any forbidden action, like committing
murder).
On the other hand it is also almost always possible to find actions that
have no influence on the deontic status of the combined action. We
would like to permit the combination of the permitted action with these
actions, without explicitly having to mention all of them.
To counter this problem we will propose another mechanism
for the actions, in the next section, which is less restrictive, but still
keeps the properties of the only operator with respect to the permission.
5 Contexts
In this section, we will introduce contexts for actions. This is a bit less
strict then the only operator. The intuitive idea is that with an action 
we specify a set of events C relative to which the semantics of the action
is taken. In the standard case this set of events is the set A the set of all
possible events (in the system). We will give a characterization of safe
contexts, which are contexts within which an action can be performed
without changing its effects.
We will now give the necessary definitions to introduce contextual ac-
tions in the syntax and give some semantics for them.
5.1 Contextual actions
We start with a definition that is needed to facilitate the other definitions.
Definition 11 Let   Act then at  is the set of events such that the
underlined version of that event occurs in .
E.g. if   a& b  c then at   fa b cg.
The set of contextual actions Act
C
can now be defined as
follows:
Definition 12 Let C  A. Act
C
is the minimally closed set such that:
1. If   Act and at   C  A then C   Act
C
.
2. If  and  be contextual actions then , & and  are
elements of Act
C
.
The set C is called the context of the action.
Notation: Because the action  plays the central role in the action
expressions, we will write the context of an action not as an operator on
the action but as a subscript. I.e. we write 
C
for C .
If the context C of an action  is A then we write  as a shorthand for

A
.
To give the semantics of contextual actions we can use the
same semantic operators as were used for the normal actions, except for
the negation, which becomes context-dependent.
Definition 13 The definition of ”
C
” is given as follows:
1. For an s-set S,
S

C



 
 CnfSg if S 	 

 
 C if S  
2. For a non-empty set T  D
T

C


fS

C
jS  Tg
The semantics of the contextual actions is now given in the following
definition.
Definition 14 The semantic function   Act
C
 D is given by:
a
C
  fS  
 
 Cja  Sg
 1C1 2C2    1C1   2C2 
 12C   1C  2C
 1C1& 2C2    1C1   2C2
 1&2C   1C  2C

C
  

C

C
  
C


fail
C
  fg
any
C
  
 
 C
It can easily be seen that these definitions are the same as before, except
that the semantics are not taken relative to A but relative to a context C.
This means that 
C
is to be read as ", possibly performed together with
any set of actions from C". Of course, if the context C is equal to the set
of all actions A, then the actions have the standard interpretation.
The following proposition relates the notion of contexts with
the only operator.
Proposition 5 Let 
C
 Act
C
such that it does not contain any negation
and C  at  then

C

D
only 
Proof: Easy by induction. 
The above proposition can be read as "only  is  done in the context
of its own atomic actions".
In the above proposition we excluded actions that contain
negations. That the equality does not hold for these actions can be seen
from the following simple example:
only a  a
while
a
a
  
After this introduction of contexts for actions, in the next section we
will show how they can be related to the deontic operators.
5.2 Safe contexts
The intuitive meaning of a (deontically) safe context for  is that 
is performed possibly together with some other actions that have no
influence on the effects of .
I.e.  open the window
C
where C is a safe context may include in
its semantics opening the window while at the same time watching
television, but not opening the window and at the same time turning on
the heater. Before we give the definition of a safe context, it should be
noted that contexts are given with respect to certain properties of the
world. For instance, in the example above we take into account the
temperature, but not the use of electricity. We will take this into account
in the definition by introducing a propositional context that indicates
which aspects of the world are taken into account. More formally:
Definition 15 Let Φ be a set of propositions closed under deduction
and containing 
V iolation, then we call Φ a deontic propositional
context.
The formal definition of a safe context can be given as follows:
Definition 16 Let Φ be a deontic propositional context and let 
C

Act
C
then C is a safe context for  in w with respect to Φ iff for all
	  Φ
w j  only 	 
C
	
Note: only  stands for only 
A
.
If w is clear from the (textual) context then we will just say that C is
safe for .
Proposition 6 If C is safe for  with respect to a deontic propositional
context Φ then
P  only    P  
C

F  only    F  
C

Proof: Follows direct from the definition. 
The following example shows how safe contexts can be used.
We assume that "chewing gum" does not affect "fire
gun". However, "aiming at the president" does affect "fire
gun". Therefore "chewing gum" is member of a safe context
of "fire gun" while "aiming at the president" is not.
Therefore we have that:
P  only fire  gun P  fire  gun
ffiregun chewgumg

but not
P  only fire  gun P  fire  gun
ffiregun aimatpresidentg

The introduction of (safe) contexts makes it possible to restrict
the interpretation of an action while still allowing the possibility to
perform it in combination with some other actions.
Proposition 7 Let  and  be action terms without negations and let
at   at   C
i
i  1 2
then 
C1&C2 	D fail
Proof: From the premisses it follows that the s-set at   at  is an
element from 
C1 &C2 and therefore C1&C2 	D fail.
 
The above proposition shows that there are cases in which it is
possible to perform a combination of actions in a certain context, while
this would not be possible if the only operator was applied on one or
both of the actions.
E.g.
a
fabg
&b
fabg
  f
 
a
b

g
while
only a&b  fg
The following proposition can be easily proven:
Proposition 8 Let C be a safe context for  then
P  
C
  F     
C
& 
D
fail
Which means that if 
C
is permitted, it is not possible to perform it
in combination with an action that is forbidden. Note that the above
implication holds trivially if no context for  is specified. The above
proposition states that even when the permission to perform  is weak-
ened to a permission to perform  only in some (safe) context of other
actions, the above implication still holds.
The consequence is that we do have the following (if C is a safe context):
P  chew gum
C
   chew gum
C
&shoot the president 
D
fail
A final point about safe contexts that should be noted is that
if an event b is an element of a safe context for a it does not imply that
a is an element of a safe context for b. I.e. the combination a&b might
include the effects from only a while it does not include the effects
of only b. This happens, for instance, if a is permitted in isolation
and also in combination with b, but b is forbidden in isolation. More
concrete this can be seen in the following example:
It is permitted to close the door. It is also permitted to close
the door and at the same time open the window. However,
it is forbidden to open the window without at the same time
closing the door.
The above means that open the window is part of a safe context of close
the door, but close the door is not part of a safe context of open the
window. This is due to the fact that "closing the door" changes the
effect of "opening the window". It is forbidden to open the window and
not close the door, but permitted to do both together.
6 Conclusions
We started with the observation that the Free Choice paradox has
two forms, each of which is the dual of the other. The first form is
P    P     for actions  and , and is called the paradox of
free choice permission. The second form is P  &  P  , and we
called this the paradox of context-sensitive permission.
We noted that any solution of the Free Choice paradox based on the
concept of choice won’t work for the paradox of context-sensitive per-
mission. In this paper we showed that both forms of the paradox can be
eliminated if we take the context in which an action is performed into
account.
In a survey of paradoxes in deontic logic, al-Hibri [AlH78]
rightly points out that the inference
P    P    
omits something, viz. the admissibility of . If we add this information,
the inference is blocked:
 P      
P     P    P    
P   P  
However, the observation that we can derive what we want if we put in
more information at the beginning, does not block the faulty inference
itself. Her observation does point the way to our solution, though, for it
makes clear that to make a choice, we must have permission to perform
the choice in any way we want. This is the idea that led to our stringent
form of permission.
We have given a solution of the Free Choice Paradox by choos-
ing a strong definition for the permission operator, that does not give the
actor the permission to choose between ways to perform the action that
lead to a violation state and ways that do not lead to such a state. The
combination of this operator with the only operator for actions avoids
the problems that were raised earlier against this definition, by elimi-
nating all possible contexts of the action. It was noted, however, that
the only operator only has a limited use (for actions in strict disjunctive
normal form) and excluding all contexts is usually too strict.
The introduction of explicit contexts gives the opportunity to
combine the strong definition of the permission operator with an "open"
specification of actions. This "open" specification is limited to possible
combinations with actions that do not interfere with the specified action
by defining safe contexts. It is not very difficult to find a safe context for
an action. (at  is a safe context for any action .) However, finding
the biggest safe context for an action is not that simple. In practice,
we are only interested to see whether a particular event is part of a safe
context of an action or not. Therefore it is usually not necessary to
explicitly construct the biggest safe context of an action. The idea is
that there are some default biggest safe contexts for each action.
The proposed solution of the Free Choice Paradox shows a
surprising connection between free choice and the context-sensitivity of
permission: An agent has a free choice between alternatives if all ways
of doing both alternatives are permitted, i.e. if both alternatives can be
done in all possible contexts.
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AIn this appendix we give the formal semantics of actions as we use it in
this paper. It is mainly a simplified (restricted to actions) version of the
semantics given in [Mey88].
A.1 Formal definition of the semantics of actions
We start with a set of events A, with typical elements a b c. There is
one special event , which is not an element of A, and which stands for
failure.(comparable to deadlock in process algebra). The set of events
A will form the basis for the semantics of the actions in our language
Act.
The atomic actions in these languages are denoted by underlined ver-
sions of events fromA. Thus if a  A then a is an atomic action in Act.
The set of all action expressions can now be determined by the following
BNF for its elements ():
 ::   aj12j1&2jjanyjfail
The meaning of 12 is a choice between 1 and 2. 1&2 stands
for the parallel execution of 1 and 2. The expression  stands for the
negation of the transaction . The any action is a universal or ”don’t
care which” action. Finally the fail action is the action that always
fails (deadlock). After this action nothing can be done anymore and the
system stops.
It is important to note the difference between the syntactical atomic
actions a and the semantical events a. The meaning of an atomic
action a involves the execution of the corresponding semantical event
a possibly together with other events! The meaning of a only specifies
the performance of the corresponding semantical a, but one is free to
perform any other set of events simultaneous with a!
The semantics of the actions consists of two parts. First we
interpret the actions in terms of (sets of) events. This part is called the
uniform semantics in the literature on the semantics of concurrency (e.g.
[dBKM+86]). The second part of the semantics is the interpretation of
the denotations of actions as state transforming functions. This yields
the non-uniform semantics. We will now start with the uniform part of
the semantics.
The semantics of actions are given by sets of what we call
synchronicity sets (or s-sets for short). A synchronicity set denotes a set
of events that are executed simultaneously. They are the basic building
blocks of the semantics.
The following definitions formally describe these sets and the ways they
can be combined to form the semantic counterpart of actions.
Definition 17
1. The set fg is a synchronicity set.
2. Every non-empty subset of A is an s-set.
Notation: We use S S1     S    do denote s-sets. In concrete cases
we write the sets with square brackets, in order to distinguish them
easily from other sets that we will use. So, the s-set consisting of  is
written as [] and the s-set consisting of the events a and b is written as
 
a
b

. The powerset of s-sets will be denoted by   A, where the ’+’
indicates that the s-sets are non-empty.
The above definition prevents the simultaneous execution of
the special event  with other events, because it is not in A. This is
necessary, because it is not possible to perform an event and at the same
time have a deadlock.
Because the language of actions contains a choice opera-
tor, which introduces non-determinism, we have to consider sets of
s-sequences as the semantics of a transaction. Each of the s-sequences
in these sets stands for a possible choice. This non-determinism is also
introduced by using the open specification of an action. That is, indicat-
ing that a is performed has as semantics that the event a is performed
alone or simultaneous with any other set of events.
Notation: We use T T1     T     to denote sets of s-sets.
Having introduced the basic elements, we can now proceed to
give the formal definition of the semantic domain of the actions with its
operators.
Definition 18 The domain D for our model for actions from Act is the
collection of sets T consisting of s-sets.
To give the denotation for all actions in Act we define the semantical
counterparts of the syntactical operators , & and negation. Before we
give these definitions, we define a handy operator on sets of s-sets:
Definition 19 Let T be a set of s-sets then
T



Tnfg if S  T : S 	 
fg otherwise
The operator T  is closely related to what is called ”failure removal”
in [dBKM+86]. The idea is that failure is avoided when possible, i.e.
when there is a non-failing alternative. In [Bro86] , this is called angelic
nondeterminism.
With this function defined, we can now give the semantical
operators on D.
For the parallel operator & we use a set-intersection , which is almost
the same as the normal set-intersection.
Definition 20 For T T   D:
T

T



T  T
 if T  T  	 
fg otherwise
The semantical counterpart of the choice operator is defined as follows:
Definition 21 For T T   D:
T

T

  T  T



The above definition states that the choice between two sets of s-sets is
the union of those two sets minus , unless the union does not contain
anything else.
The last definition defines the semantic counterpart of the
negation (non-performance) of an action.
Definition 22 The definition of ”” is given as follows:
1. For an s-set S,
S




 
 AnfSg if S 	 

 
 A if S  
2. For a non-empty set T  D
T



fS

jS  Tg
The idea of these definitions is the following: For an s-set (S 	 ) the
negation just yields the set-theoretic complement of fSg with respect to

 
 A). For the negation of a set of s-sets T we take the intersection of
the sets(!) of the negations of all the s-sets contained in T .
With these definitions, we can now define the semantics of
actions in Act.
Definition 23 The semantic function   Act  D is given by:
a  fS  
 
 Aja  Sg
12  1 2
1&2  1 2
  

fail  fg
any    A
From the definitions above, it follows that the semantics of the negation
of the atomic action a consists of all the s-sets that do not contain the
event a. Thus the meaning of a is the choice of doing any set of events
(simultaneously) as long as they do not include a.
In the following definition we define the (in)equality of actions
in terms of their semantics.
Definition 24 We define1 D 2 iff [[1]]= [[2]]. We define1  2
iff [[1]] [[2]].
If 1  2 then we say that 1 involves 2.
Proposition 9
1.  D&
  fail is a boolean algebra.
2. D satisfies the following property concerning the special ac-
tions:
fail 
D
any
Proof: Clear by the proposition. .
A.2 Actions and worlds
In this section we will relate the actions of Act to worlds in which they
are performed. Intuitively, the execution of an action in a world yields
a collection of worlds which one might reach by performing the action.
First we introduce a function 	. For a given set of worlds W
this function is an element of   A     W  1 W . Here
1 W  stands for the sets of elements of W that consists of at most
one element. The function determines the behaviour of the s-sets, i.e.
the sets of events that are executed simultaneously. We thus assume
that each s-set has a deterministic behaviour. The function 	 is left
unspecified except for its behaviour on the s-set []. The behaviour of
the function 	 on other s-sets depends on the events, which are in their
turn dependent on the application. A way to specify the behaviour of 	
in terms of the changes that are made by performing the set of events in
an s-set is given in [Dig89]. Taking the function 	 as a basis, we then
define a function F that determines the behaviour of sets of s-sets.
Definition 25
1. 	  w  
2. The function F  T     W     W  is defined induc-
tively by:
F  S W0 
S
wW0f	 S wgfor S  
 
 A  and W0 W
F  T  W0 
S
ST
F  S W0
The semantics of actions in a certain world can now be given by the
function 
F
which is an element ofAct  W    W  and which
is defined as follows:
Definition 26

F
 w  F   fwg
